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Abstract 
 
We investigate the underlying reasons for producers’ choice of marketing 
channels for stocker cattle in the United States.  In addition to traditional public auctions, 
private sales, video auctions, and Internet auctions have been recently used in the 
marketing of stocker cattle.  We find that while the number of marketing options may 
have increased in recent years, only relatively large producers can actually take 
advantage of these options.  The marketing options for smaller producers are still limited 
due to their relative size.  We also find that the number of cattle marketed privately and 
through video and Internet auctions is positively correlated with herd size.  In addition, 
the New Institutional Economics (NIE) provides insights into how herd size influences 
the choice of marketing channels.
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Marketing Channels for U.S. Stocker Cattle and the Limited Use of E-Commerce∗ 
 
Introduction 
Recent technological advancements such as the use of video and Internet auctions 
have increased the number of marketing options available to certain agricultural 
producers.  In this paper, we focus on the marketing of stocker cattle in the United States.  
While the number of marketing options may have increased in recent years, only 
relatively large producers can actually take advantage of these options.  The marketing 
options for smaller producers are still limited due to their relative size.  There are 
economies of scale in both production and marketing.  In addition to traditional public 
auctions, private sales, video auctions, and Internet auctions are used in the marketing of 
stocker cattle.  However, we find that the number of cattle marketed privately and 
through video and Internet auctions is positively correlated with herd size.  Alternatively, 
public auctions are less popular in states with large herd sizes.  The New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) provides insights on how herd size influences the choice of marketing 
channels. 
We briefly describe the evolution of marketing channels for cattle in the United 
States and the impact that farm size and direct transaction costs have on the choice of 
marketing channel.  We then derive a theoretical model in order to explain producers’ 
                                                 
∗ We would like to thank Jill Hobbs for her comments on an earlier version of this paper.  
Also, we thank Professor Bruce Babcock at CARD for financial support on a related 
project on marketing stocker cattle in Florida.  Also, the comments from the various 
attendees at the CARD-E-Commerce Session in San Diego, California, February 10, 
2002 are greatly appreciated.  Lastly, we thank the more then fifty experts from the top 
fifteen cow/calf producing states who talked to us via telephone on the significance of the 
various marketing channels for U.S. stocker cattle. 
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choice of various marketing channels in terms of producer size.  The results of a 
statistical analysis based on empirical evidence that supports this hypothesis are 
presented.  Finally, the underlying rational for this result is explored further in terms of 
indirect transaction costs and the NIE framework of Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985, 
1998). 
Williams and Stout (1964) recognized that livestock auctions, virtually non-
existent up until 1920, arose out of the necessity for a more efficient price discovery 
mechanism for a large number of small buyers and sellers.  They found that by 1956, 
30.5 percent of stocker cattle were marketed through public auctions, while 11.1 percent 
were marketed through terminal markets, 25 percent were marketed through dealers, and 
29.6 percent were marketed through direct private sales among producers.  This can be 
contrasted to feeder cattle bound for slaughterhouses, the majority of which were 
marketed through terminal markets at that time.  This difference between marketing 
stocker vs. feeder cattle was due to the fact that terminal markets provided a point of 
aggregation for animals destined for packinghouses while stocker sales involved less 
centralized points of delivery. 
While Williams and Stout discuss the rationale behind the introduction of live 
cattle auctions, rapid technological advances have introduced the possibility of alternative 
auction mechanisms.  Schmitz, Schmitz, and Moss (2002) provide a detailed description 
of the current marketing institutions for stocker cattle.  They identify four categories of 
marketing channels.  These are public auctions, private sales, video auctions, and Internet 
auctions (E-Commerce).  In order to determine the breakdown of stockers marketed 
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through local livestock auctions1, video auctions, Internet auctions, and private sales2 in 
the United States, we focus on the top 15 beef cow producing states provided in Table 1.  
The largest beef cow producing state is Texas with over five-million head followed by 
Missouri and Nebraska.  Of the top 15 cow/calf producing states, Wyoming is ranked 
fifteenth with a total of eight-hundred and twenty-five thousand head.  The top fifteen 
states have roughly 72% of all beef cows in the United States. 
In order to obtain data regarding the choice of marketing mechanism for stocker 
cattle in the United States, we interviewed at least 2 livestock marketing experts in each 
of the top 15 beef cow producing states: one from the state cattlemen’s association, and 
one from a state academic institution including cooperative extension.  The raw data 
resulting from this survey are provided in Table 2.  In order to provide a more meaningful 
method of comparison, the average of the expert opinions for each of the 15 states, along 
with the weighted average sales for each market outlet, are given in Table 3.  Public 
auctions are the most common marketing outlet, followed by private sales, video sales, 
and lastly Internet sales.  When weighted by the number of beef operations, roughly 66% 
of the stocker cattle are marketed through local public auctions, 19% are sold privately, 
11% are sold through video auctions, and 5% are marketed through E-commerce.  When 
weighted by the number of calves marketed, the percentages are 61%, 23%, 5% and 1% 
respectfully.  However, there are significant differences among states in terms of the use 
                                                 
1 Public sales also include individual producers’ calf sales, for which they market their 
entire calf crop through public auctions.  However, these sales represent a small 
percentage of total public auction sales.  Often, the volume of sales is sufficient to market 
outside of a public auction channel, through private and other mechanisms.  Moreover, 
public auctions do not necessarily imply herd sizes of less than one hundred head. 
2 Many private sales are not direct from producer to buyer.  Often, order buyers perform 
the function of an intermediary, bringing the buyer and seller together. 
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of marketing channels.  For example, in Montana, 67.5 percent of the stockers are 
marketed privately while in South Dakota 72.5 percent are marketed through public 
auctions.   
The percentage of producers with herd size greater than 500 and herd size greater 
than 1000 are also provided in Table 3.  The evidence suggests that producers’ choice of 
marketing channel is related to herd size.  The larger the herd, the greater is the tendency 
for farmers to market cattle privately and through Internet and video mechanisms.  
Transactions costs play a major role in determining the choice of marketing options 
among producers.  For example, in order for a producer to be able to participate in video 
or Internet auctions, hundred calf-size lots of the same sex are usually desired, because 
efficient transportation of cattle requires that the number of calves be large enough to 
completely fill a large truck.  Thus, even though marketing outside of public auctions 
may reduce marketing costs, these markets are not available to small producers.  This was 
one concern raised by D. Gale Johnson in his study on the efficiency of the U.S. cattle 
industry.  Johnson (1989) notes that the level of beef production and consumption in the 
United States at the turn of the century will be determined by the beef producers in 
reducing their production costs and the ability of processors and merchandisers to reduce 
their costs.  Hence, the relative competitiveness of the beef sector is dependent on the 
technical efficiency of its marketing mechanisms. 
 The differences in direct marketing costs associated with each market outlet are 
primarily the result of differences in transportation costs and commission charges.  One 
of the largest direct marketing costs associated with local livestock auctions is the cost of 
transportation.  When producers market cattle through a local livestock auction, they 
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transport cattle to the auction facility.  Cattle are then unloaded, sold, and reloaded for 
shipment to some final destination.  Stockers purchased are moved from the auction 
facility to the purchaser’s facility.  These transportation costs can be much higher than 
under private sales where cattle move directly from seller to buyer with only one load and 
unload transaction.   
 Commissions charged by video or Internet auctions are lower than commissions 
charged when selling stocker cattle through public auctions (Schmitz, Schmitz, and Moss, 
2002)3.  Video auctions typically charge a catalogue fee.  For example, Superior 
Livestock Auction of Denver, Colorado and Dallas, Texas charges a $2.00/head fee for 
advertising.  If the cattle are actually sold, this fee is credited against a 2 percent sales 
commission.  Superior charges a 1.5 percent commission without a catalogue fee for 
Internet sales.  On the other hand, the Ocala Livestock Auction in Ocala, Florida, for 
example, charges 4 percent commission per head.  This result is consistent Bailey, 
Peterson, and Brorsen (1991) who found that the net prices paid by buyers and received 
by sellers in video auctions exceeded the prices for live cattle auctions. 
 The differences in commissions charged in different marketing outlets 
demonstrates the advantages to marketing by truckload lots.  Cattle marketed through 
video or Internet auctions have to be in lot sizes of 100 head minimum.  Cattle are 
delivered from the producers’ ranch and trucked directly to the buyer’s facilities.  A pen 
of cattle sold through a video auction in Florida can be loaded onto a truck from the farm 
and shipped directly to a feedlot that can be hundreds of miles away (e.g. the Texas 
                                                 
3 Within traditional local auction houses, commissions vary significantly by region.  For 
example, at the Ocala Livestock Auction in Ocala, Florida, the commission is four 
percent per head.  However, other auction facilities have sliding scales depending on the 
number of cattle sold.   
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panhandle) thus avoiding many of the commission charges associated with public 
auctions. 
Supply and Demand of Intermediation for Stocker Cattle 
The selection of marketing mechanism described above raise several issues 
regarding the supply and demand for marketing services (or intermediation) in the stocker 
cattle markets.  Specifically, the empirical data suggest that intermediaries (the owners of 
local livestock, video auction, and Internet auction facilities) are able to segment the 
market in a way that either extracts additional rents (through higher commissions in local 
livestock auctions) or is economically inefficient.  This section examines both of these 
possibilities by modeling the supply and demand of intermediation for stocker and feeder 
cattle. 
 Figure 2 presents the market for intermediation in the stocker cattle market before 
the emergence of video and Internet auctions (for simplicity, we exclude private sales).  
Figure 2(a) depicts the demand for marketing services by large producers, ALD , at local 
livestock auctions, and Figure 2(b) presents the demand curve for small producers, ASD .  
Horizontally adding the demand curve for large and small producers yields the total 
demand curve for intermediation of stocker cattle facing the local livestock auction 
houses, ATD , in Figure 2(c).  The intersection of the supply curve for marketing services 
by local livestock auctions ( ) with the total demand curve for intermediation yields an 
equilibrium price of intermediation of 
AS
Ap (the per unit price of marketing services).  At 
this price,  cattle are sold by large producers through local livestock facilities and  
cattle are sold by small producers through local livestock facilities. 
A
Lq
A
Sq
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 Figure 3 presents the market for intermediation in the stocker cattle market after 
the emergence of video and Internet auctions.  Figure 3(a) depicts the demand for cattle 
marketing services through video and Internet auctions, VLD .  The location and slope of 
this demand curve is dependent on transaction costs, including transportation costs.  To 
examine the implications of the location and slope of the demand curve for marketing 
services, consider the demand curve for intermediation of cattle through video and 
Internet auctions for small producers, VSD , depicted in Figure 3(b).  The demand curve for 
intermediation through video and Internet auctions is much lower for small producers, 
because cattle marketed through these mechanisms imply significant costs.  Specifically, 
smaller lots would be offered a lower price due to the diseconomies associated with 
shipping less than truckload lots, if these auction houses allowed small lots to be listed at 
all.  Alternatively, joining with other producers to offer truckload lots could be costly.  In 
most cases, the total supply of intermediation services through video and Internet 
auctions ( S  in Figure 3(c)) and demand for intermediation through those auctions (V VTD  
in Figure 3(c)) will yield a price above the choke point for the participation of smaller 
producers in these auctions.  Thus, only larger producers will market cattle through video 
and Internet auctions, offering quantity  at price VLq Vp  (where Vp  is the price for 
marketing services offered by video and Internet auctions). 
 The introduction of video and Internet auctions reduces the demand for cattle 
marketed through live auctions.  This has implications for the market for intermediation 
faced by local livestock auctions.  As depicted in Figure 4(a), the use of video and 
Internet auctions causes the demand for intermediation through local livestock auctions to 
shift inward from ALD  to ALD′  for large producers.  This inward shift implies an inward 
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shift in the total demand for intermediation in Figure 4(c) from ATD  to ATD′ .  Given that 
the supply curve for intermediation is held constant at , the price of intermediation 
falls from 
AS
Ap  to Ap′ .  Larger producers still market cattle through local livestock 
auctions (the quantity of stocker and feeder cattle sold by large producers through local 
livestock auctions falls from  to ALq ALq′ ), but these cattle represent “odd lots” cattle that do 
not fit the truckload lots for some reason.  Further, the reduction in commissions causes 
the quantity of cattle marketed by smaller producers through local auction facilities to 
increase from  to .  However, this increase may be short-lived as auction facilities 
close in some areas. 
A
Sq
A
Sq′
1
0
In the preceding analysis, we model the supply of services as upward sloping.  
Given this assumption, the transaction cost of selling cattle through the public auction fall 
as more and more producers sell through other marketing channels.  Whether or not this 
is actually the case is an empirical question and its not dealt with here.  Clearly we could 
adapt the model to employ perfectly elastic or perfectly inelastic supply curves in order to 
adjust for different margins related to different types of auctions. 
We now introduce the effect of scale economies that can reduce transaction costs.  
Figure 5 presents the marginal cost of production for two groups of producers.  0MC  is 
the marginal cost of production for smaller producers (producers with small cowherds) 
while MC is the marginal cost of production for larger producers.  We assume that larger 
producers obtain economies of scale in production so that their marginal cost curve lies to 
the right of the marginal cost curve of the smaller producers.  Next, we assume that p%  is 
the value of stocker cattle sold to backgrounders and/or feedlots.  Smaller producers incur 
a transaction cost of t for sales through local auction houses.  The final price realized by 
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these smaller producers is 0 0p p t= −% .  Transaction costs for larger producers are lower 
than transaction costs for small producers.  Larger producers incur a lower transaction 
cost, t , and receive a higher final realized price1 1p for their cattle because they can take 
advantage of lower transaction costs offered by markets that are non-public in nature.  
This scenario implies two distinct advantages to size.  The first advantage is the typical 
increased returns to scale.  If the prices were, in fact, the same for smaller and larger 
producers, the economic rent to larger producers ( 0p cd  in Figure 5) is greater than the 
economic rent for smaller producers ( 0p ad ).   The second advantage is to decrease 
transaction costs.  When larger producers are allowed to market a portion of their cattle 
through alternative market outlets with lower transaction costs, the rents to larger 
producers increase to 1p ed .  Hence, the increased rents due to reduced transaction costs 
become 1 0p ecp . 
An Empirical Model of the Effect of Herd Size on the Choice of Market Outlets 
A minimum number of animals are required in order for stocker producers to be 
able to access video and Internet market channel options.  Due to transportation costs and 
other considerations, hundred calf-size lots of the same sex are usually required.  This 
leads to our hypothesis that as herd size increases, the greater will be the use of marketing 
channels other than live auctions.  In Figure 1, we show the distribution of cattle numbers 
by cowherd size for Florida, Montana, North Dakota and Texas.  Montana markets only 
12.5 percent of their stocker and feeder cattle through local livestock auctions while 
North Dakota markets primarily through the public auction (Table 3).  This difference in 
the choice of marketing channels can be attributed primarily to differences in herd size.  
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In Montana, 51 percent of the cattle are from herds of more than 500 cows whereas only 
24.4 percent of the cattle in North Dakota are from large herds.  The two predominant 
channels for marketing stockers in the U.S. are public auctions and private sales.  Over 80 
percent of cattle are marketed through these means.  As farm size increases, the number 
of cattle sold through public auctions declines, and the number sold through private 
auctions increases. 
 For some states, twenty percent of stockers are marketed through video auctions.  
Those interviewed indicated that video auctions are growing in importance.  The number 
of stockers marketed through Internet auctions is small, less than 5 percent in most states 
(Table 2).  Internet auctions, like private sales, require relatively large sale-lots, but for 
whatever reason, it has been unable to compete with video and/or private sale, even 
though they too require large-scale lots.   
 In order to formally test the relationship between cowherd size and choice of 
marketing outlet, we regress the share of cattle sold in each marketing mechanism on the 
share of cattle in herd sizes greater than 500 head in each state.4  This model takes the 
form: 
ijjijijij eSY ++= βα  
Where Yij is the proportion of stocker cattle in State j, sold through marketing channel i, 
αij is the constant associated with market i in State j, Sj is the share of producers in State j 
                                                 
4 USDA keeps track of producer size by breaking producers up into several categories.  
Two of the categories used by the USDA are ranches with between 500 and 1000 head, 
and ranches with more than 1000 head.  Upon discussion with industry experts, a 
producer needs at least 400 head of cattle to be able to completely fill truckload lots.  
Since the only available data from the USDA uses the aforementioned categories, our 
definition of large herd size for the purposes of this analysis uses more than 500 head as 
the criterion. 
 11
with a herd size of more than 500 head, βij is the slope associated with market i in State j, 
and eij is a random error term.  Performing ordinary least squares, one for each marketing 
channel i, yields estimates: 
SY iii βα ˆˆˆ +=  
Where iαˆ is the constant associated with marketing channel i, is the slope associated 
with marketing channel i, and S is the average share of producers with herd sizes larger 
than 500 head.   
iβˆ
The ordinary least squares results for each of these four regressions are presented 
in Table 4.  The regression results based on relative numbers of cattle operations are 
presented in the second column while the third column presents the results weighted by 
the number of calves in each state.  We use two alternative weighting methods in order to 
account for differences in the relative cattle numbers in each state.  In the first method, 
the states are weighted by number of beef operations.  This method disregards differences 
in herd size, and implicitly places a disproportional emphasis on smaller herds.  In the 
second method, the states are weighted by calf numbers.  This method places more 
emphasis on larger operations.  The results are fairly consistent regardless of the 
weighting.  
 The regression results indicate that the share of cattle marketed through local 
livestock auctions decreases as the share of large herds in a particular State increases 
(Table 4).  These results support the conjecture that owners of larger herds prefer 
truckload-marketing outlets.  The empirical relationship between herd size and share of 
stocker cattle marketed through local auction houses is presented graphically in Figure 6.  
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This relationship appears to be fairly robust with the possible exception of a single outlier 
(Montana).5 
 The empirical results also indicate that the share of cattle marketed through video 
and Internet auctions increase as herd size increases.  While both results are statistically 
significant at any conventional level of statistical significance, the estimated parameter 
for video auctions is roughly three times larger than the result for Internet auctions.  This 
supports the preference of producers for video auctions over Internet auctions.  However, 
a time series is needed to determine whether this preference is stable, or whether farmers 
will increase their use of Internet auctions over time. 
 In Table 4 we also present the results of the effect of herd size on the share of 
private sales.  Unlike the results for the other marketing mechanisms, the relationship 
between herd size and the share of cattle marketed by private sales is not statistically 
significant at the 0.10 confidence level.  Two possible explanations for this lack of 
significance can be suggested.  The first explanation is purely statistical.  Specifically, the 
prevalence of private sales in Montana negatively impacts the statistical relationship.  
The Cook’s D statistic for Montana is 0.169 when the sample is weighted by the number 
of beef operations, and is 0.534 when the sample is weighted by the number of stockers 
marketed.  While these statistics do not indicate undo influence, the regression results 
excluding Montana are reproduced in Table 5.  This specification yields a negative 
coefficient on herd size that is statistically significant at the 0.10 level of confidence. 
                                                 
5 To examine the influence of Montana, we applied Cook’s test (Cook 1977, 1979).  The 
Cook’s D statistic for Montana was 0.181 that is distributed 1,14F .  Thus, we reject the 
hypothesis that Montana has a detrimental effect on the regression results. 
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 Another potential explanation for the statistically insignificant results associated 
with private sales is that, unlike video and Internet auctions, private sales represent a 
fairly diverse group of marketing relationships.  At one extreme, private sales occur 
through truckload sales by large producers based on reputation.  At the other extreme, 
private sales can also represent a small-scale transaction from between neighboring 
producers.  In fact, these small direct producer-to-producer sales probably represent the 
majority of the sales observed by Williams and Stout (1964).  Undoubtedly, these small 
producer-to-producer sales have become less important through time, but the existence of 
these types of transactions introduces additional noise to the regression results.   
 Lastly, the efficiency of public livestock auctions varies across states.  It may well 
be that public auctions in states that have large herd sizes are relatively efficient.   As a 
result, the number of private transactions may be reduced even though herd sizes are 
large.  
New Institutional Economics and the Choice of Marketing Outlet 
Apart from the direct transaction costs discussed in previous sections, the 
alternative marketing mechanisms for stocker cattle also involve indirect transaction 
costs.  While direct transaction costs refer to such things as transportation costs and 
commissions charged for various marketing outlets, there also exist a wide array of 
indirect transaction costs when marketing stocker cattle.  This section discusses the 
linkage between the choice of market outlet and indirect transaction costs within the 
framework of Williamson’s New Institutional Economics (NIE) (1975, 1979, 1985, 
1998).  
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Williamson expands on the earlier work of Coase (1937) to address the question 
of the boundaries of the firm.  Specifically, Coase suggests that vertical integration will 
occur if the transaction costs are greater than the diseconomies of scope.  In Williamson’s 
world, the concept of transaction costs includes the cost of impacted competition, where 
buyers fail to fully signal the value of an input (in our study the stocker cattle market is 
an input market for feedlots).  Within this paradigm, there may be certain aspects of 
stocker cattle marketing that can give (relatively larger) buyers some degree of market 
power that can be used to extract economic rents from the seller.  Following 
Williamson’s approach, three factors determine the degree of imperfection in the input 
market: asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency.   
Applying the transaction cost paradigm to slaughter cattle markets in the United 
Kingdom, Hobbs (1997 p. 1083) states: “Transaction cost economics, unlike traditional 
neoclassical theory, recognizes that commercial activity does not occur in a frictionless 
environment.”  She notes that part of that friction entails the cost of information 
associated with determining a price for the good.  She develops a list of transaction cost 
variables, divided into three parts: Information costs, negotiation costs, and monitoring 
costs.  A survey was constructed and implemented around this list of transaction costs.  
While Hobbs specifically looks at slaughter cattle markets in the UK, which is different 
than the markets for stocker cattle in the US discussed in this paper, several of the 
different types of transaction costs developed in that study are relevant for our purposes.  
In terms of information costs, price uncertainty, auction price information costs, and 
direct sale price information costs apply to the choice of marketing channel for stocker 
cattle in the US.  Negotiation costs include auction transportation costs, auction 
 15
transportation effort, direct sale transportation effort, sales commissions, speed of 
payment, the risk of non-sale at auction, unequal bargaining power in private sales from 
small producers to large buyers, frequency of auction sales, time spent at the auction, and 
adequate number of buyers at the auction.  Monitoring costs include shrinkage losses, 
carcass damage, and quality information uncertainty. 
While an empirical analysis of the effects of indirect transaction costs on the 
choice of marketing channel are beyond the scope of this paper, the theoretical analysis 
contained in Figures 2-5 could easily be adapted to include indirect transaction costs, if 
these ever become quantifiable.  Our discussion of direct transaction costs suggests that 
larger farmers have a significant advantage in marketing stocker cattle because they can 
access several markets, including those such as video and Internet auctions that have 
lower direct transaction costs.  Smaller producers generally can only access public 
auctions.  When one adds indirect transaction costs, there also may be savings for large 
producers who can market outside of public auctions.  In this case, the transaction costs 
savings t0 in Figure 5 contains two positive components.  On the other hand, there is a 
possibility that the savings in direct transaction costs by going outside of public auctions 
is opposite in sign to the savings in indirect transaction costs.  This possibility can be 
incorporated into Figure 5 by viewing t0 as the net savings in transaction costs (both 
direct and indirect). 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into detail regarding all of the 
possible different indirect transaction costs identified by Hobbs (mainly due to the lack of 
empirical evidence), we include a discussion of a few key issues that are of importance in 
determining the choice of marketing channel for stocker cattle in the US.  One important 
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issue is with regards to the cost of shipping.  The actual freight charge may be a minor 
part of the shipping cost.  As cattle are shipped and aggregated they lose weight (suffer 
shrink) and have a higher probability of disease such as Bovine Respiratory Complex 
(Nyamusika et al. 1994).  When sold via video or Internet auctions in truckload lots, 
cattle are only moved once, eliminating one source of shrink, and minimizing the 
exposure to disease.  Hence, ceteris paribus, cattle marketed through video or Internet 
auctions as truckload lots should earn a higher price.   
Another important issue is the asset specificity and price uncertainty involved 
when smaller producers contract with larger buyers through direct private sales.  A small 
producer is limited to the choice of either live auctions or private sales.  Many of these 
private sales are contracts with smaller producers that include specific quality 
specifications.  If a smaller producer repeatedly sells their stocker cattle to a certain buyer 
under strict quality specifications, asset specificity is introduced.  If the buyer decides to 
offer a price that is lower than what a producer would expect to receive at a live auction, 
that producer may be restricted from entering the live auction due to the increase in 
transaction costs involved with moving from a private sale to a live auction.  Moreover, 
when a small producer sells directly to a large buyer, the price discovery mechanism is 
not as efficient as in an auction with a large number of buyer and sellers.  This implies 
that there is more price uncertainty involved with private sales, and larger buyers may be 
able to extract monopoly rents from small producers. 
One final issue involves the indirect transaction costs associated with auctions 
themselves.  One conjecture from auction theory (Milgrom 1989) is that the existence of 
different types of livestock auctions expand the number of potential buyers over what is 
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available from other existing marketing mechanisms.  However, McPherson (1956) found 
that local livestock auctions in Florida yielded lower prices than other mechanisms.  
McPherson attributes this result to limited supplies and higher variability in the number 
of quality cattle offered at local livestock auctions.  If a particular type of livestock 
auction is characterized as having small numbers of cattle or if the number of cattle 
offered at a given sale is highly uncertain, then buyers will not rely on these sales.  As the 
number of buyers declines, consistent with auction theory, the pricing efficiency and 
expected price both decline.  McPherson concludes that larger auctions yield higher 
prices and are more efficient at price discovery.  These findings are also consistent with 
more recent results by Troxel et al. (2002).   
The above discussion may also apply to the option of marketing stocker cattle 
through the Internet.  With reference to Table 2, the relatively low percentage of cattle 
sold through Internet auctions may be attributed to several types of indirect transaction 
costs, including:  (1) slow-speed and somewhat unreliable internet connections cause 
unacceptable delays between the time the producer submits a bid and the time he receives 
the results; (2) the rate of computer literacy among cattle producers is relatively low; (3) 
the uncertainty in the degree of security involved with a given transaction; (4) uncertainty 
in the ability to actually collect payment; and (5) the quality and reputation of the cattle 
sold by sellers in many cases are unknown to buyers; and (6) if there are not a large 
number of buyers and sellers involved in an Internet auction, the price discovery 
mechanism will not be efficient and producers would receive a lower price than they 
would receive through other marketing channels.  Finally, quality uncertainty remains an 
important issue for both video and Internet auctions, which may explain the relatively 
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slow rate of adoption of these marketing channels when compared to the traditional live 
cattle auction (Table 2). 
Conclusion 
Based on a survey of livestock marketing specialists in the 15 most important 
cow-calf producing states in the United States, significant differences exist in the choice 
of stocker cattle marketing outlets.  This study explores the underlying reasons for these 
differences based on the composition of cowherds among these states.  Specifically, there 
is statistically significant evidence to support the hypothesis that the use of live cattle 
auctions is more prevalent in states with smaller cowherds. 
 One possible explanation of the prevalence of livestock auctions in states with 
smaller cowherds is the role of transaction costs.  Smaller producers may choose local 
livestock auctions because they cannot offer the truckload lots required for either video or 
Internet auctions.  This choice leads to both higher direct and indirect transaction costs.  
Increased direct transaction costs are explicit through higher commissions and increased 
transportation costs while higher indirect transaction costs may result from reduced 
competition in local livestock auctions. 
Given that larger producers market their cattle in truckload lots, one of the 
striking features of marketing stocker beef cattle in the United States is the limited use of 
Internet auctions.  The empirical results indicate that the use of Internet auctions 
increases across states as the herd size increases.  However, the effect of herd size on the 
use of Internet auctions is roughly half that of video auctions.  The relatively low 
percentage of cattle sold through Internet auctions may be attributed to an increase in 
indirect transaction costs.  
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In order for E-Commerce to grow, it must compete with video and private sales, 
given that a certain percentage of cattle will be marketed through public auctions due to 
the large number of cattle that are sold by producers with a small herd size.  E-Commerce 
is at a disadvantage to private sales and video auctions because a certain level of 
technological competency is required in order to participate in an Internet auction.  
(Surveys suggest that in general less than 20 percent of U.S. farmers actively use 
computer technology for their farm businesses).  Moreover, the slow speed of dial-up 
internet connections used by most producers makes the use of internet auctions 
technologically infeasible in many instances due to a disruption in service and/or the 
extensive delay from the time a bid is sent to the time it takes to reach the auction site, be 
processed, and send the results back to the producer.   
The much larger prevalence of video auctions as opposed to Internet auctions may 
be attributed to the fact that the technology required to participate in video auctions is 
less expensive and has been proven over time.  However, quality uncertainty remains an 
important issue for both video and Internet auctions, which may explain the relatively 
slow rate of adoption of these marketing channels when compared to the traditional live 
cattle auction.  In addition, reputation effects are significant in prices received for stocker 
cattle.  Often, in private sales buyers and sellers have known each other for generations, 
hence the quality of cattle sold is known with almost complete certainty.  Moreover, in 
many live cattle auctions, the name of the seller is mentioned and a reputation effect 
occurs as well. 
The New Institutional Economics provides insight into whether or not this form of 
marketing will grow.  Of importance is the notion that regardless of farmers’ computer 
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literacy (or lack thereof) E-Commerce is not likely to be adopted by small producers.  In 
order to use marketing channels outside of public auctions, minimum herd size lots are 
needed.  However, there are instances in which small producers could combine their calf 
crop in order to reach truckload lot sizes.  This strategy appears to have been successful 
in a few states, which explains, in part, the growth in video auctions.6 
The empirical results support the conjecture that private sales expand as herd size 
increases.  Private sales between cow-calf producers and backgrounders or feeders 
represent the smallest direct transaction costs.  Specifically, these sales have no 
commission (most large feedlots use order buyers to purchase their cattle regardless of 
the market outlet) and identical transportation costs as video and Internet auctions.  
However, this marketing mechanism is also subject to indirect transaction costs.  
Offsetting the increased indirect transaction costs are the reputation effect and increased 
information available to larger producers.  In essence, a large producer reduces the 
potential indirect transaction cost by maintaining the option of marketing cattle through 
either video or Internet auctions. 
Clearly, future research along the lines of Hobbs is required in order to quantify 
indirect transaction costs for stocker cattle.  Our discussion on direct transaction costs 
deals primarily with Florida.  Further work is clearly needed regarding indirect 
transaction costs for marketing stocker cattle through various marketing outlets for the 
U.S. cattle industry. 
                                                 
6 For example, in Tennessee there has been significant growth in video auctions (20 
percent of stockers were marketed in 2001 using video auctions).  Video auctions are 
expected to increase as efforts are being made to group cattle so that minimum sized lots 
can be achieved, and sold through video.  This has been facilitated through various 
institutions, including the Giles County Alliance. 
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 Table 1 Beef Cows on Hand by State (Jan 1, 2001) 
Ranking (1,000 head) 
1) Texas 5,465 
2) Missouri 2,070 
3) Nebraska 1,950 
4) Oklahoma 1,910 
5) South Dakota  1,809 
6) Montana 1,531 
7) Kansas 1,524 
8) Kentucky 1,060 
9) Tennessee 1,035 
10) North Dakota 1,002 
11) Iowa 985 
12) Florida 975 
13) Arkansas 929 
14) Colorado   840 
15) Wyoming 825 
  
U.S. Total 33,400 
Top 10 Total 19,356 
Top 10 as Percent of U.S. Total 58 
Top 15 Total 23,910 
Top 15 as Percent of  U.S. Total 72 
Source: Livestock Dairy Poultry Summary (Florida 
Agricultural Statistics 2000). 
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 Table 2. Market Mechanism Share by State 
 Source of data 
 Livestock Association University Specialist 
 Market Mechanism Market Mechanism 
 
Local 
Auctions 
Video 
Auctions
Internet 
Auctions
Private 
Sales 
Local 
Auctions
Video 
Auctions 
Internet 
Auctions
Private 
Sales 
Texas 57.0 25.0 15.0 3.0 65.0 8.0 3.0 24.0 
Missouri 65.0 5.0 5.0 25.0 80.0 3.0 3.0 14.0 
Oklahoma 60.0 8.0 2.0 30.0 60.0 10.0 5.0 25.0 
Nebraska 60.0 5.0 4.0 31.0 60.0 5.0 5.0 30.0 
South Dakota 65.0 10.0 5.0 20.0 80.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 
Montana 15.0 20.0 5.0 60.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 75.0 
Kansas a a a a 55.0 15.0 10.0 20.0 
Kentucky 86.0 2.0 2.0 10.0 90.0 1.0 4.0 5.0 
Tennessee 70.0 20.0 0.0 10.0 85.0 3.0 0.0 12.0 
North Dakota 80.0 7.5 2.5 10.0 65.0 10.0 5.0 20.0 
Iowa 60.0 3.0 2.0 35.0 84.0 1.0 1.0 14.0 
Floridab 55.3 19.8 7.3 17.7 55.3 19.8 7.3 17.7 
Arkansas 73.0 2.0 1.0 24.0 92.0 6.0 1.0 1.0 
Colorado 40.0 35.0 5.0 20.0 55.0 14.0 1.0 30.0 
Wyoming 20.0 35.0 5.0 40.0 40.0 25.0 5.0 30.0 
Source: Author’s Interviews. 
aKansas Livestock Association did not respond. 
bResults from a more detailed survey in Florida (Schmitz, Schmitz, and Moss). 
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 Table 3. Marketing Mechanism for Stocker Cattle by State 
 
Marketed 
Through 
Local 
Auctions 
Marketed 
through 
Video 
Auctions 
Marketed 
through 
E-Commerce
Marketed 
through 
Private 
Contact 
Herds 
Greater 
than 500 
Herds 
Greater 
than 
1000 
Texas 0.610 0.165 0.090 0.135 0.470 0.360 
Missouri 0.725 0.040 0.040 0.195 0.120 0.050 
Oklahoma 0.600 0.090 0.035 0.275 0.350 0.230 
Nebraska 0.600 0.050 0.045 0.305 0.640 0.500 
South Dakota 0.725 0.050 0.025 0.200 0.415 0.205 
Montana 0.125 0.150 0.050 0.675 0.510 0.250 
Kansasa 0.550 0.150 0.100 0.200 0.580 0.470 
Kentucky 0.880 0.015 0.030 0.075 0.090 0.038 
Tennessee 0.775 0.115 0.000 0.110 0.070 0.019 
North Dakota 0.725 0.088 0.038 0.150 0.244 0.074 
Iowa 0.720 0.020 0.015 0.245 0.270 0.140 
Floridab 0.553 0.198 0.073 0.177 0.562 0.430 
Arkansas 0.825 0.040 0.010 0.125 0.140 0.065 
Colorado 0.475 0.245 0.030 0.250 0.685 0.540 
Wyoming 0.300 0.300 0.050 0.350 0.620 0.360 
Weighted by Number of Beef Operations     
Average 0.658 0.105 0.050 0.187 0.342 0.233 
Std. Dev. 25.769 12.319 6.160 18.987 36.537 31.474 
Weighted by Calves Marketed      
Average 0.608 0.114 0.051 0.227 0.400 0.267 
Std. Dev. 6.907 2.834 1.162 5.553 7.360 6.397 
Source: Authors’ interviews. 
a Kansas Livestock Association did not respond. 
b Results from a detailed survey in Florida (Schmitz, Schmitz, and Moss, 2002). 
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Table 4. Effect of Herd Size on Choice of Marketing Mechanism 
(Percent of Cattle in Herds over 500) 
 
Weighted by 
Number of Beef 
Operations 
Weighted by 
Number of Calves 
Marketed 
Sold Using Local Auctions 
Constant 0.843*** 0.851*** 
 (0.049)a (0.088) 
Share of Herds over 500 Head -0.542*** -0.608*** 
 (0.125) (0.198) 
Sold Using Video Auctions 
Constant 0.027 0.019 
 (0.027) (0.037) 
Share of Herds over 500 Head 0.228*** 0.236** 
 (0.069) (0.084) 
Sold Using E-Commerce 
Constant 0.010 0.017 
 (0.013) (0.016) 
Share of Herds over 500 Head 0.118*** 0.085** 
 (0.034) (0.037) 
Sold Using Private Contact 
Constant 0.120*** 0.112 
 (0.052) (0.085) 
Share of Herds over 500 Head 0.196 0.287 
 (0.133) (0.194) 
Source: Author’s computations. 
aNumbers in parenthesis denote standard errors. 
***Denotes statistical significance at the .01 level of confidence. 
**Denotes statistical significance at the .05 level of confidence. 
*Denotes statistical significance at the .10 level of confidence. 
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Table 5. Effect of Herd Size on Choice of Marketing Mechanism 
Excluding Montana (Percent of Cattle in Herds over 500) 
 
Weighted by 
Number of Beef 
Operations 
Weighted by 
Number of Calves 
Marketed 
Sold Using Local Auctions 
Constant 0.838*** 0.843*** 
 (0.031)a (0.045) 
Share of Herds over 500 Head -0.493*** -0.506*** 
 (0.079) (0.103) 
Sold Using Video Auctions 
Constant 0.027 0.020 
 (0.028) (0.039) 
Share of Herds over 500 Head 0.228*** 0.233** 
 (0.072) (0.089) 
Sold Using E-Commerce 
Constant 0.009 0.017 
 (0.014) (0.017) 
Share of Herds over 500 Head 0.120*** 0.088** 
 (0.035) (0.039) 
Sold Using Private Contact 
Constant 0.126*** 0.121** 
 (0.035) (0.041) 
Share of Herds over 500 Head 0.145 0.185* 
 (0.089) (0.093) 
Source: Author’s computations. 
aNumbers in parenthesis denote standard errors. 
***Denotes statistical significance at the .01 level of confidence. 
**Denotes statistical significance at the .05 level of confidence. 
*Denotes statistical significance at the .10 level of confidence. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Cattle Inventory by Herd Size 
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Figure 2. Supply and Demand for Intermediation in Stocker Cattle through Local 
Auctions before Video and Internet Auctions 
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Figure 3. Supply and Demand for Intermediation of Stocker Cattle through Video 
and Internet Auctions 
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Figure 4. Supply and Demand for Intermediation through Local Livestock Auctions 
after Video and Internet Auctions 
 30
0MC
1MC
0p a
b
c
d
0q 1q 1q′
1p
Quantity
Price
e
p%
0t
1t
 
Figure 5. Effect of Reduced Transaction Costs on Economic Rents at the Farm 
Level 
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Figure 6. Relationship Between Herd Size and Share Marketed Through Local 
Auctions 
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